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The concept of recognition in “The Phenomenology of Spirit” as discussed in the context of the lord and bondsman relationship is an interaction between two self-consciousnesses. It is important to note that recognition is further developed beyond the lord and bondsman discussion and is related closely to Spirit which the entire text concerns itself with. For the purposes of this examination in relation to the question the role of recognition will be distinctly limited to the lord and bondsman discussion.
Hegel uses the lord and bondsman relationship to tease out the necessary role that recognition has in relation to the Spirit and to self-consciousness. The discussion of lord and bondsman is used by Hegel to illustrate the ostensible workings of recognition upon the self-consciousness and the changes that are affected by recognition upon the positions known as lord and bondsman.
To understand recognition we must first come to understand the changes of consciousness in the ‘l’. Each consciousness identifies itself as a subject; an essential subject against everything else. By essential subject it is meant that the ‘I’ (subject) would not exist without consciousness. Thus consciousness is essential to the life of the subject. Essential to the ‘I’ also is a use of recognition in the shaping of the consciousness against objects in the world.
The self-consciousness is purely a subject and is devoid of an object. A single self-consciousness will accept an essential character for itself, but being doubting in nature it seeks a truth value. The self-consciousness Desires truth certainty of itself in its subjectivity. That is to say that for the self-consciousness to know its essential quality with any certainty it must receive recognition of its essential quality by another independent self-consciousness.
A self-consciousness will always acknowledge another self-consciousness because it recognizes the object of its Desire within the other. The human Desire is not for another Desire, but for the reflection of its very own essential character.
The act of acknowledgement by the self-consciousness allows it to see itself reflected in the other self-consciousness. That is, the self-consciousness becomes aware that in the eyes of the other it is inessential and is an object of Desire. The consciousness wants to use the other as a tool for the constant assertion of an essential, universal, quality of the particularities of the consciousness. The recognition of the inessential relationship each self-consciousness has to the other causes each to claim greater need over the other.
“First, it [consciousness] must proceed to supersede the other independent being in order thereby to become certain of itself as the essential being; secondly, in doing so it proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself.”
At this point both entities must enter into a struggle to gain prevalence over the other and have their essential quality recognized by the other. Previous to this, both consciousnesses acknowledged the other’s existence, and under this relationship they existed, but there is a Desire to be the first and foremost self-consciousness; the self-consciousness that needs to be.
Prior to entering into the “life and death struggle” Hegel sets up the two separate consciousnesses as mediators for each other. This is a key step in the understanding of recognition and the eventual victory of the bondsman. The two self-consciousnesses position themselves so that they can only be for themselves in the other. Each uses the other self-consciousness to see itself reflected as a being for itself. In this movement they have set themselves into what Hegel refers to as a ‘double movement’ . In this double movement a temporary mutual recognition takes place, for each consciousness sees in the other itself existing merely for itself. However, the other is unessential for self-consciousness, and it is problematic to have oneself existing for oneself in another, due to the fact that this inadvertently makes the unessential other essential. Which cannot be because the self-consciousness, having gained certainty of itself via the other, cannot obtain certainty of the other to base its certainty upon.
To achieve the pure abstraction of being-for-self, the self-consciousness must show a complete disattachment to life. A self-consciousness will choose this action out of Desire that overpowers the biological attachment of self-consciousness . The action derived from Desire does not align completely with Kojéve; in the first instance Kojéve insists that Desire is ‘Desire for Desire’ and secondly, also ‘Desire for Recognition’, both of which are incorrect. Thirdly Kojéve uses Desire as both a motivation and an ends which is circular and problematic. From recognition comes certainty of the essential character, and within this certainty is freedom, which is the heart of all Desire.
“And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won; only thus is it proved that for self consciousness…that is only pure being-for-itself.”
It is important to flesh out what the aims of this struggle are to find that the end goal is not recognition itself, as recognition takes on many duties throughout the interaction of consciousnesses, and in a broader sense tied into spirit. The aim then for the consciousness is to reach an abstract being-for-itself, which for consciousness represents freedom in the form of an independent consciousness. The independent consciousness has its certainty of its essential nature independently justified. The aim for the independent consciousness is to make this state of certainty permanent.
“The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognised as a person, but he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.”
There are two outcomes from the death struggle. Firstly that one consciousness dies, thus leaving the other lacking a mediator. Secondly that one consciousness submits to the other in desperation for one’s life. In the latter case an abstract negative relationship occurs where the positions of lord and bondsman take shape. The lord at one extreme, the victor of the struggle, is recognized without recognizing. While the bondsman at the other, the subjugated, mediates recognition and immediately recognizes the lord without receiving recognition. It seems this way as much as each acts out their role. The bondsman is not under continual threat of life after the struggle, it is a perceived threat of life. So the bondsman is in this position so long as the position is acknowledged by the bondsman and the bondsman acknowledges the lord as lord. In similar fashion the same goes for the lord. These positions are valid so long as each member recognizes them as valid. As an outside observer there can be viewed a means by which this relationship may come to an end.
The bondsman sets-aside his own consciousness just as the lord has done to him. “For what the bondsman does is really the action of the lord”. It is the bondsman who exists only for the lord. The lord should exist solely for himself. Already the bondsman is unknowingly undermining the lord, and as the inequality in recognition continues the bondsman will only be coerced into further methods of undermining the relationship. The lord assists in this usurping by supplying to the bondsman an ideal above and beyond biological ends. Fulfilling the lord’s desires as work provides the consciousness of the bondsman with a distance from its survival needs, as the bondsman is not under direct threat of life from the lord. The connection between the lord and bondsman is distinctly the lord’s desires and it is the spiritual form of recognition that the bondsman receives. In order to complete the work the bondsman must recognise some of the lord’s desires as his own.
Essentially this is the double reflection of the consciousness. Both self-consciousnesses draw their needs from the other. The only consciousness that the lord can draw upon is the bondsman’s dependant consciousness, thus the lord cannot draw truth certainty from the bondsman. The lord’s need of truth certainty becomes once again unfulfilled. For an independent-consciousness to gain truth certainty for itself it must have recognition from another independent-consciousness. However the lord has made the bondsman a dependant consciousness and in doing so lost its own claim to truth certainty. While the bondsman has a reason to live, namely for the lord. The bondsman can draw mastery and finally independence from the lord (in the shape of work). It is the bondsman who has, in the end, the independent self-consciousness to reflect truth certainty.
“Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is. …Work…is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This negative middle term or the formative activity is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence.”
The bondsman exists for work, work that is for the lord, but this extreme relationship cannot continue. Soon enough the bondsman will come to identify himself so much in the work that the work will be his alone, and then the bondsman will exist for himself. The work is shaped by the bondsman’s self-consciousness, thus externally manifesting truth certainty for self-consciousness independently in the work. Desire for the bondsman has been relegated to pure moments of negating the object and has no permanence or independence. The physical manifestation of the bondsman’s work however has both permanence and independence. Because the bondsman can identify himself in the work; his mastery, his efforts, it is this physical change of nature that comes to represent the permanent and independent aspect of the bondsman’s Desire. Unlike the lord, the bondsman’s Desire for affirmation of truth certainty is not within another independent self-consciousness. The lord/bondsman relationship had created circumstances in which the dependent consciousness had a non-biological ends that allowed the shift of truth certainty to move into the ideal. The ideal, of course, is physically manifested in the work that is devoted to the ideal; the physical change in nature by the self-consciousness bears a reflection of the maker’s self-consciousness.
The role of recognition is inextricably bound to the essential quality that each self-consciousness seeks to ascertain as a true value to itself, which is Desire. The Desire that all self-conscious beings have is for pure-being-for-self. The pure-being-for-self may be narrowed into a independently justified ‘I’ as an essential manifestation of the spirit.
The self-consciousness which is being recognised as having an essential quality can find a temporal harmony in the lord/bondsman relationship. For the self-consciousness which is being recognised, namely the lord, is being recognised by a dependent consciousness, which does not satisfy Desire.
“The slave’s servitude has become inverted into a type of mastery over the world through work. And because the master still essentially belongs to this world of nature, the slave has potentially achieved mastery over the master himself.”
A self-consciousness can only recognise its pure-being-for-self in something that may reflect another self-consciousness. The problem is that it cannot be found in another self-consciousness permanently. The bondsman circumvents this problem by finding recognition within the objects of its labour, due to the labour being shaped by the bondsman’s self-consciousness there lies evidence of the existence of consciousness.
Throughout discussion on the lord and bondsman the faculties of recognition have varied but remained essentially the same. It has been ascertained that it is a self-consciousness that does the recognising. It follows then that a self-consciousness may only recognise what it already knows. And all that it knows is itself. So a self-consciousness can only recognise itself in something other than itself.
In the lord/bondsman relationship a unique type of recognition is introduced. Namely the recognition of a negative. The negative is the Desire of the self-consciousness. Desire is something that the self-consciousness knows, because it is essentially a part of itself, but it is something that it does not have. Furthermore the Desire of the consciousness is specifically a non-object; self-consciousness has a Desire for affirmation of an essential self quality.
Now there is recognition of the self, and recognition of Desire. Both are related to truth certainty and the spirit, as the self is derived from spirit and the self-consciousness lacks certainty over its belief as an essential manifestation of spirit.
Self-consciousness can recognise the quality of the relationship it has with another. At first a recognition of an unessential relationship occurs, and eventually the lord recognises the relationship to the dependent consciousness, so too does the bondsman recognise a relationship with work. Again the recognition of relationship is in reference to what the relationship may do to reflect the truth of the essential character of each self-consciousness. And in fact, as far as the lord/bondsman self-consciousness is concerned, the act of recognition is parcelled for the search of an essential existence of the self-conscious.
Bibliography
Hegel. Phenomenology Of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977
Heidegger, Martin. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Parvis Emad & Kenneth Maly. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988
Jurist, Elliot. ‘Hegel’s Concept of Recognition.’ Owl Of Minerva. 19 (1987): pages 5-22
Kojéve, Alexendre. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Edited by Al. Bloom. Translated by James H. Nichols, jr. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969.
Redding, Paul. Hegel’s Hermeneutics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Endnotes:
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 122
Kojéve, Alexandre – Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969 – pg 38
Ibid pg 40 – Here Kojéve talks about the human Desire as being for another Desire (non-being), and Desire for recognition. On the first count Kojéve is falling onto anthropological grounds [an anthropological approach to Hegel’s idea of Desire and consciousness is problematic as one tends to presuppose Geist as an absolute spirit from which consciousness is derived, where Hegel is more logically deriving shapes of consciousness vie intersubjective relationships between the consciousness and the world], and on one level I agree that the Desire is ‘directed’ toward another consciousness (non-being), but it is not specifically the other’s Desire that it is being directed at. Hegel is more specifically talking about the self-consciousness’s Desire to be justified as essential. It is clear that the self-conscious is purely subjective and in these ends cannot call upon an objective measure of truth, but must be justified by a reflection of consciousness because only something that exists can cause a reflection. On the second account, Desire for recognition, Kojéve is flawed. Hegel has stated, and it is noted by Redding, that ‘man (consciousness) is recognition’ (Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics pg 121).
Kojéve, Alexandre – Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969 – pg 58
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 180
Ibid § 183
Kojéve, Alexandre – Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969 – pg 41
Ibid pg 40
I have previously briefly discussed Kojéve’s concepts of Desire in footnote 5.
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 120
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 187
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 126
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 187 – this quote is particularly important in clearing up Kojéve’s remark on pg 41 – “the being that cannot risk its life in a Fight for Recognition, [his italics] in a fight for pure prestige [his italics] – is not [his italics] a truly human [his italics] being.’ Kojéve cannot mean that the bondsman lacks what he has said are the basic prerequisites of personhood; Desire for Recognition. Although there are problematic circularities in Kojéve’s definition of Desire his understanding of the bondsman’s ability to free himself in his work is useful in understanding recognition.
Ibid § 188
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – 124
Ibid - 125
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 191
Ibid § 191
Kojéve, Alexandre – Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969 – pg 42
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – 125
Ibid pg 125
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 192
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 126
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 195 – this quote is also used by Paul Redding (Hegels Hermeneutics) on page 126. Essentially I am using this quote to illustrate a very similar point, that the independence and permanent nature of the work, as it is shaping the natural world, creates an object in which the bondsman may see himself reflected and thus gain certainty of existence and essential character. i.e. nature would remain unchanged without such self-consciousness. Redding makes his point in such a manner: “The slave has to be able to recognize his desire in the expression and, even more important, has to be able to make it his own [his italics] (we might say acknowledge [his italics] it as his own) and have it direct his [his italics] actions.” – Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 126.
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 126.
Hegel’s Phenomenology § 195
Redding, Paul – Hegel’s Hermeneutics; Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996 – pg 120. See footnote 6 in Redding, where he discusses the first existence of self-consciousness as from intersubjective processes or a generic form. Although this requires further discussion, and a paper on its own, it is my understanding that it is the intersubjective processes between consciousness that form the spirit and thereby pave the way for consciousness to become self-aware. Thus there are inextricable links between self-consciousness, recognition and Spirit, so much so that the existence of one enforces the existence of the others.
Ibid – pg 126.
Term used by Kojéve . Kojéve, Alexandre – Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969 – pg 40
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The strict vegan, who will not wear leather, has a serious philosophical conflict. The very film used to capture his performance contains gelatin. Gelatin is a product derived from animals such as pig, cattle, fish and poultry.
Gelatin is used in all photofilm as a suspension liquid for the photosensitive salts that react to light and create the image on the film. At present the gelatin is not synthesised. And there is no 'vegan' substitute. Gelatin is a product from an animal.
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