PHIL3510 What are the most important criticisms of contemporary liberalism put forward by communitarian thinkers? Discuss some of these objections and assess attempts to answer them from a liberal point of view.

Communitarian criticism of contemporary liberalism focuses on three important arguments; the priority of individual rights versus the priority of a concept of the good, the philosophical liberal concept of the self as an unencumbered self, and the foundation of justice as a universal. Although communitarian critiques may be at some levels contradictory in nature, there is throughout a common thread of curtailing the liberal philosophy of Rawls of its abstract formation of Justice and Identity. The important dialogue between communitarian and liberal arguments has been in relation to A Theory of Justice by Rawls and then in relation to the revised text Political Liberalism by Rawls.

The foremost typifying point of contention within liberalism is a foundation on a rights based theory where individual rights are first and foremost. In a reaction against theories of utilitarianism, perfectionism and monarchy (divine rule), Rawls leans on the enlightenment use of (pure) reason and Kantian theories to cultivate a legitimate use of rights as a starting point for liberal political theory. The priority of rights, individual rights, in the liberal philosophy maintains that amongst all individuals there exists a set of unwavering rights to belong to each, and that each would recognise as fair. The set of rights that everyone is granted may be attributed because the rights are not contingent. Within this system of rights each individual may find the freedom to develop their own sense of good so long as their actions do not impede another’s rights.

It cannot be said that such reasoning is successful in substantiating a legitimate grounds for rights for everyone, and rights that supersede all else. The rights based system may be seen as a universalistic theory in the sense that a priori to any place in the world, for now and for always, these sets of rights hold a true and permanent position within the political sphere of humankind. Being universal in nature, the priority of rights has come under the attack that all universal and essentialist theories have been vulnerable to. The universal theory of rights rests on Kantian arguments of reason, namely that one may come to purely reasoned conclusions that satisfy as justification. The legitimacy of reason itself, and the terms of use for reason may undermine the authority of such an argument. There is no evidence without doubt that may give absolute authority of one reason over another, and how that reasoning may be applied. For an adequate authority to be instilled within such justification there must, a priori, be a set of qualifications for using reason, and then, a priori, a set of knowledge in understanding those qualifications and so on and so forth. The appeal to the universal reasoning behind a set of priority individual rights become de-authorised, and the only appeal is left within those individuals who agree with the use of such reason, thus making the rights contingent.

Sandel tempers an argument against a theory of rights with a theory based on the good life, a theoretical ideal good life that is contingent upon the citizens that recognise the good life. The priority of the good defines the values and formations of good that exist within a community and forms them as guiding political principles. From these common values and formations of what is good there exists a conception of what each deserves and how each ought to treat another. Each may identify with this overarching guide by realising the representation of his or her own values within the greater common political value system. In opposition to rights that are reasoned to be a priori, and which are set out to be applicable to all at all times and thus universal in their nature, is a priority of the good life in which all members of community, within their roles of the community, indicatively form the ‘political good life’. Such political common ground forms a basis on which justice and freedom as normative concepts may evolve and continue to evolve alongside the community. In this sense the political sphere remains responsive to the community and the community recognises its influence within the political sphere and is thereby willing to continually engage in political discourse.

Liberals insist that finding common ground within a pluralistic society is fruitless if not impossible, because the resulting values would be so general and washed out as to become useless in their practical sense of driving forward a community and protecting its members. The liberal fear of utilitarianism is adequate in explaining this rebuff; that without a clear set of defining principles that protect the individual then the individual may be made to submit to a greater good as the society is viewed by the State as a single entity. The adverse situation could be more disastrous, the chance that a community is overwhelmed with a majority, a majority that holds extreme views. Potentially a common good may arise that is harmful to a small minority of members within the community, a resulting totalitarian like State would dominate legitimised by the masses. The practical means of converging distant moral beliefs in a pluralist society is sought by the instruction of liberal principles of justice that do not favour any side in social controversy. Rawls insists that anyone under any circumstances may be persuaded to accept neutral principles of justice, however on this point Rawls removes the unencumbered self, and the thought experiment, from the principles. This remains an unpersuasive argument for a neutral State as it practically seems necessary to debate at a political level socially important issues in order to be political responsive to citizens and to politically motivate them. The neutral State could propagate a homogenic mass culture that would threaten cultural diversity. Rawls argues that the neutral State allows for autonomous citizens to recognise the worth in the good life and still have the freedom, as protected in rights, to act accordingly; yet if autonomy can only develop in a social context then autonomy needs to be recognised as a common good by the State, Taylor comments. At this point both the liberal and the communitarian arguments agree on the need for cultural diversity and autonomy, however they disagree on the involvement the State should play in securing these elements of community.

The relationship the citizens have to a liberal rights based government is also a concern for communitarians. If the State, as liberal arguments suggest, has as much a priori legitimacy as it possibly can, in its facets as rights based, in its formulation of the individual, in its sense of justice, and in how it deals with social discourse, only the citizens that can recognise and then agree with the liberal principles of a priori reasoning will find a connection with the State. A State that is so far removed from its own citizens may not be able to legitimise itself with its own members, despite what righteous actions it may be taking, because if the citizens of a nation cannot play an integral role in its development, in its decision making process, in its fundamental rights to its citizens then the worth of membership fails to be meaningful. Perhaps it is only in a situation where the individuals recognise themselves in the same way that the liberal State recognises them that such a priori construction may garner general support. The communitarian argument reverses the subject and object so that, the State may recognise its members as the members recognise themselves.

The justification for the priority of rights may be seen in terms as resting on a particular conception of the good that recognises persons as the unencumbered self. The unencumbered self is an understanding of self that Rawls developed in Theory of Justice and later in his revised liberalist text, Political Liberalism, relegated it to the field of Comprehensive or Philosophical Liberalism while arguing that Political Liberalism had no need for the unencumbered self.

The unencumbered self is a model on which a liberal State should view its individual citizens. The individual is viewed before its attachments to the world may be realised. That is to say that aspects of an individual, that include sex, race, age, talents, disabilities, wealth, and class, are deemed irrelevant for the purposes of dealing with the State and for building the a priori systems of justice. The unencumbered self proves useful in Rawls’ thought experiment the original position in which a group of unencumbered selves set about creating the principles of justice, which Rawls then goes on to set out and justify. The principles are:

- each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all

- inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to expect that they will work out for everyone’s advantage…and are open to all.

The unencumbered self allows the individual to remove herself from all associations that may influence the concept of justice, in particular justice as fairness. The idea behind the unencumbered self, is not to create a practical use of Kant’s transcendental self, but rather to create a position in which the State may deal with each person in the same way justly, without taking into account any such characteristics that may present a favour one way or another. There are two major difficulties with the formation of the unencumbered self. Firstly the individual is likely not to relate to themselves and others in this abstract way. So in an everyday scope, privately and publicly, people conduct themselves and their own sense of justice without the use of the unencumbered self. Individuals recognise others by their characteristics, some of which are undeniably belonging to a person, however not necessarily essential. Without the ability to recognise themselves in this way the individual is lacking the very foundation on which they base what is right. The unencumbered self also rules out certain ends that may exist for an individual, which contradicts the ends based reasoning of the priority of rights. If individuals do not formulate rights and justice in this abstract way, via the unencumbered self, there is no basis for the State to do so. Despite these communitarian arguments the use of the unencumbered self has an internal conflict with the application of the priority of rights at a national level. If the unencumbered self provides a working perspective in which any person may stand and deduce the same principles of justice, and those principles of justice work in a universal priority of rights, then those rights should be able to extend to all persons globally. Rawls applies this theory only to a national level, which only further raises questions referring to the constitution and relevance of membership.

The communitarian concept of the embedded self is a model under which the State understands its citizens in a context of each individual’s associations to their community; how they recognise themselves. The State attempts, as best it can, to recognise its members as the members recognise themselves and each other. So that the State acknowledges the variety of characteristics that are embedded within the individual, the variations that occur within characteristics, and that these characteristics may change over time. If the State recognises citizens in this way then the citizens will have a greater reason for legitimising the State, and the State will be better able to accommodate and accentuate the growth of a pluralistic society. Yet the task may be too large, the acknowledgement of some character may offend the sensibilities of another and the sense of detachment from an otherwise neutral State may be exaggerated by the communitarians.

In addition to the difficulties that are present with a State that deals with its citizens in such an abstract manner, the ideal Liberal State further supports a neutral State so that no one individual may be considered more or less than another, or group of others. The neutral liberal State is not practically neutral in the same way that it theoretically claims to be, and the theoretical neutrality of the State does not benefit the ends of its citizens. Firstly the so-called neutral State is not neutral. Apart from collecting monetary taxes, the State, viewing the individual as an unencumbered self uses the talents of the individual as a means to others, which directly contradicts the liberal ideology of treating everyone as ends in themselves. As the logic follows, because ‘I’ as an individual have no claim to ‘my’ talents then humankind as a (State controlled) collective has a universal claim upon them, yet without a common good and only a system of individual rights as a basis of justice then it seems that these talents are used as another’s means.

Walzer expresses the opinion that a position absent from the community, or from the world, is unattainable and that a concept of fairness derived from such a perspective is impractical. A practical theory of justice, as Walzer claims, is a working structure of justice where people place value upon goods that are socially important; by understanding the value of social goods a State may come to understand the justice derived from the community. In essence there is a separation of people who act rationally from those who act from belief. Justice as the first theory of liberty relies on the ability of citizens to conduct their selves rationally. However people evidently do not conduct themselves rationally in the sense that Rawls insists. People gather values and a sense of justice through belief, such as religion and most working liberal governments recognise this in a practical sense of positive freedom by giving tax exemptions to religious organizations. A normative account of freedom may be given because an analysis of the context prior to the formation of the concept can show the importance that the citizens place on social goods. A commonly used example of this normative account is the comparison between the freedoms to choose one’s own religion as compared to the freedom one has as a citizen on the roads. The freedom of choice can clearly be ranked, one deemed more important than the other. No matter how many choices of peanut butter one may have at the countless variety of supermarket chains this choice is of a less important quality then our choice to worship in whichever fashion one wishes to, or to be able to interpret as many media sources as desired. There exists State value in building the positive attributes that exist in the community associations that people make. In the liberal States of today there exists taxes and levies on alcohol and concessions for the arts, and tax exemptions for religious organizations. Such a response to social goods is an acknowledgement of the benefit these associations have to the citizens in both their private sphere and their public sphere. Thus, the neutral liberal State is not neutral on two accounts: the exemptions and taxation of particular social goods and the discrimination on the basis of abilities in the difference principle. The liberal State lacks the greater directive role that a ‘priority of good’ political system could achieve with these distinctions.

The liberal theory is met with a strong communitarian challenge on account of its abstraction of political rights and system of justice. The shortcomings of this abstraction in its distancing from the very public it serves to protect and the loss of legitimacy from the public are concerns that liberal theorists continue to reflect upon. The disagreement at an essentially bare and basic level boils down to a liberal faith in the citizens to rationally recognise the reasoning behind the priority of rights and thereby culturally enrich society with the freedom to enact their own concept of good against the communitarian belief in the need for political support for such cultural diversity within the community and a recognition of community values at a political level.
Bibliography

Buchanan, Allen. ‘Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’, in Ethics, vol. 99, (1989) pp. 852-882, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Dagger, Richard ‘Communitarianism and Republicanism’ in Handbook of Political Theory, (1990) pg 167-179

Gutman, Amy. ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 14 (1985) pp. 308-322, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Kymlicka, Will, ‘Community’, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, (1997) Oxford, Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers.

Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy, (2002) New York, Oxford University Press

MacIntyre, A. After Virtue, (1981) London, Duckworth

Rawls, John Philosophical Review, vol. 67 (1958) pg 164-194

Rawls, John A Theory of Justice, (1999) rev ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press

Rawls, John Political Liberalism, (1996) New York, Columbia Press.

Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and its Critics, (1984) Oxford, Basil Blackwell

Sandel, Michael, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, in Political Theory, 12, (1984) pg 81-96

Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, (1998) Cambridge University Press, Second ed.

Swift, Adam. Political Philosophy: A Beginner’s Guide For Students And Philosophers, (2001) Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.

Taylor, Charles Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol II, (1985) Cambridge University Press

Walzer, Michael, Spheres Of Justice, (1983) New York, Basic Books

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end notes

Sandel, Michael, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, in Political Theory, 12, (1984) pg 81-96
Rawls, John A Theory of Justice, (1999) rev ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Ch.2
A continual appeal to a greater level of reason is required to justify the claims already made. Kant addresses this existential dilemma in his appeal to phenomenology in The Critique of Pure Reason. Hegel addresses this issue differently in his theories of sublimation in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, (1998) Cambridge University Press, Second ed. Preface & 184-200
Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy, (2002) New York, Oxford university Press. Ch 6
Kymlicka, Will, ‘Community’, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, (1997) Oxford, Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers. Pg. 367-372
Ibid.
Rawls, John Philosophical Review, vol. 67 (1958) pg 164-194

Gutman, Amy. ‘Communitarian Critics of Liberalism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 14 (1985) pp. 308-322, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Gutman draws this point from the liberal response of Okin. Gutman continues to mount a position from which a priority of good may counter overt (unruly) majorities by strengthening the good in the minority groups and highlighting the elements of acceptance and equality within the majority.
Rawls, John Political Liberalism, (1996) New York, Columbia Press. This point and direct reference is made in Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Pg 184-200
Ibid.
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, (1998) Cambridge University Press, Second ed. Preface & 184-200
Taylor, Charles Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol II, (1985) Cambridge University Press. Pg 185-288
Rawls, John Political Liberalism, (1996) New York, Columbia Press. This point is restated in Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Pg 184-200
Kymlicka, Will, ‘Community’, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, (1997) Oxford, Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers. Pg. 367-372
Ibid.
Taylor, Charles Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol II, (1985) Cambridge University Press. Pg 185-288
Dagger, Richard ‘Communitarianism and Republicanism’ in Handbook of Political Theory, (1990) pg 167-179
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, (1998) Cambridge University Press, Second ed. Preface & 184-200
Ibid.
Rawls, John A Theory of Justice, (1999) rev ed. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Ch 2
This is the first principle of justice. Ibid.
This is the second qualifying principle of justice. Ibid.
Ibid.
Sandel, Michael, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, in Political Theory, 12, (1984) pg 81-96
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, (1998) Cambridge University Press, Second ed. Preface & 184-200
Taylor, Charles Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol II, (1985) Cambridge University Press. Pg 185-288
Both Walzer and Dagger bring up this point in a slightly different fashion to each other but the effect is the same. They both find a contradiction in the form of membership that draws boundaries around a nation while claiming to have universally applicable rights and justice for all. Walzer, Michael, Spheres Of Justice, (1983) New York, Basic Books / Dagger, Richard ‘Communitarianism and Republicanism’ in Handbook of Political Theory, (1990) pg 167-179
Dagger, Richard ‘Communitarianism and Republicanism’ in Handbook of Political Theory, (1990) pg 167-179
Walzer, Michael, Spheres Of Justice, (1983) New York, Basic Books. Pg 6-28
Sandel, Michael, ‘The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self’, in Political Theory, 12, (1984) pg 81-96. A similar notion is also expressed in MacIntyre, A. After Virtue, (1981) London, Duckworth
Kymlicka, Will, ‘Community’, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, (1997) Oxford, Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers. Pg. 367-372
Kymlicka, Will, Contemporary Political Philosophy, (2002) New York, Oxford university Press. Ch 6
Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and its Critics, (1984) Oxford, Basil Blackwell. Ch 4
Walzer, Michael, Spheres Of Justice, (1983) New York, Basic Books. Pg 6-28
Ibid.
Taylor, Charles Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol II, (1985) Cambridge University Press. Pg 185-288
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. See above, as mentioned previously.
Kymlicka, Will, ‘Community’, in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, (1997) Oxford, Cambridge Mass Blackwell Publishers. Pg. 367-372

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