Tuesday, July 29, 2008
PHIL2515 Existence & Alienation
This paper presents a close textual analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s works On the Social Contract and On the Inequality of Man (The 2nd Discourse) in relation to Immanuel Kant’s works Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (Groundwork) and Lectures on Ethics in an effort to examine the influence of Rousseau on Kant’s moral system. The examination will show that Rousseau’s notion of self has a profound influence on Kant; in particular, upon the foundations upon which Kant begins his system of morality in Lectures On Ethics, and Groundwork. As Rousseau does not explicitly detail a notion of self the focus of my argument will be in the construction of Rousseau’s presupposed self from his explication of both the will and amour propre. I will argue that Rousseau proposes an understanding of the self that is rational, autonomous, self-legislating and essentially good; and by amour propre the self will be placed with others. In turn this will be contrasted with Kant’s understanding which is that the self is a rational being that essentially has a good will which is used to self legislate. The aim of my analysis is to provide an entry and a particular sense into the profoundly difficult Kantian philosophy of morality. An entry that identifies the source of Kant’s self and helps show his ‘moral law’ derived from the self.
In On The Social Contract Rousseau sets out to answer the question ‘what is law’ and in doing so he constructs a political theory wherein democratic sovereignty formulates law that ensures the civil liberties of all via the ‘general will’. The ‘general will’ is that which the self would submit to so long as everyone else would also submit to the same. For Hobbes the law is the dictates of the sovereign composed of a small council of individuals to which all others submit; Rousseau is not satisfied that Hobbes’ account is either legitimate or practical. Rousseau argues that such a council cannot have legitimate authority over all its subjects. Rousseau proposes a democratic formulation of sovereignty, which he argues is the only means of legitimising the sovereign and practically associating all subjects to the sovereign. In order to associate all the subjects of a State , Rousseau develops a notion that he calls the ‘general will’, which is properly understood not as the will of all, but as the will of the body politic framed against every individual will and encapsulating every individual will – Rousseau elucidates what he sees as the relation between wills in On The Social Contract.
“There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will. The latter considers only the common interest; the former considers private interest, and is only a sum of private wills. But take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out, and the remaining sum of the differences is the general will.”
For Rousseau in the very generation of the ‘general will’ there is a presupposition that every self has a will of their own. By way of examining the will we will gain insight into Rousseau’s self.
For our purpose it is prudent then, to locate the place of the will and its function in the self, because the will is a defining characteristic for the Rousseauian self. Rousseau identifies the will as the rational drive of action, while bodily drives he calls passions. This is an important distinction of drives and figures prominently in his subsequent analysis in the 2nd Discourse in two regards. Firstly this distinction posits two separate origins for action, and thus moral behaviour, which has the effect of creating conflict within the self. Secondly Rousseau claims that the passions can be made to submit to the will, which creates a rational standard for the self to judge action. Rousseau makes plain the submission of the passions to the will in the 2nd Discourse.
“The law, in general less strong than the passions, restrain men without changing them.”
Thus, Rousseau’s position is that bodily needs and desires must be answered, but within society the will restrains the immediacy of the body. Reason delays the fulfilment of the passions in recognition of the law.
Before we take a look at the use of reason in the Rousseauian self, I will examine the manner in which Rousseau splits the self into the passions and the will. Rousseau’s distinction between the passions and the will is similar to the manner in which Kant separates the moral self into ‘thought’ and ‘experienced’ in the text Lectures On Ethics. Macmurray argues that Kant grounds the moral worth of action in the realm of the thought only.
“Kant thinks it important to distinguish the theoretical from the practical elements in moral action, to separate the intellectual activity of judgement through which we determine what action ought to be done from the practical activity of the will which determines the performance of the action.”
Macmurray points out Kant’s division of moral action, separating the thought from the experienced, which places the will as a link between thought and experience. Rousseau identifies two sources of action, furthermore he claims that moral action can only come from one source, the will. Kant, on the other hand, splits moral action into practical and theoretical; the will, which Rousseau identifies, Kant splits into two, the will of action and the judgement of action. The will, in both Rousseau and Kant, is situated as the basis for the moral ought of action and the enaction of the ought.
Rousseau’s separation of the self into two distinct origins of action – rational and bodily – is a pre-cursor for the radical Kantian separation of the phenomenal and the noumenal self. Rousseau’s rational/bodily separation is an example of how a self can have two independent sources of knowing the world that do not influence each other and can independently institute action. Rousseau does not investigate the consequences of his separation apart from the significance of the rise of reason in determining action in the 2nd Discourse. Neither does Rousseau deny that the two parts of the self can work co-operatively, in fact he states the opposite. However the separation is one that is radically developed by Kant in the Critiques , and is evident in the discussion on the good will in the Groundwork. Kant identifies the noumenal self as the realm in which reason operates and thus a moral code is constructed. The Kantian phenomenal/noumenal distinction and Rousseau’s will/passions are not the same separation; but Kant’s thinking can be seen as a development upon Rousseau’s separation through to the formulation of a moral structure from the noumenal self, which I will show in the manner in which both Kant and Rousseau define the use of reason. In the Groundwork Kant sets out to clear the foundation on which morality is structured by discounting the sources of morality that are essentially ‘red herrings’. To this end Kant discredits the sensible world and the world of the intelligible, leaving an outline of the noumenal that he will not construct until the Critiques.
“Reason may be kept, on the one hand, from searching around in the sensible world – greatly to the detriment of morality – for the supreme motive and for some interest, comprehensible indeed, but empirical; and it may be kept, on the other hand, from flapping its wings impotently, without leaving the spot, in a space that for it is empty – the space of transcendent concepts known as ‘the intelligible world’.”
What Kant has arrived at is a sphere of the self which is radically separated from the phenomenal world, a world in which reason alone is posited. Only because reason is universal, Kant argues, can a moral system derived from reason be of worth and applied universally.
By examining how Rousseau explains the functionality of the will I can draw out how the Rousseauian self uses reason and then compare it to how the Kantian self uses reason, which should give us an insight into the separation of the self. According to Rousseau the origin of the passions is the body; the involuntary reactions and feelings the body has to the world and to its own sustenance stimulate action. i.e. If the body is hungry then it seeks food; if the body sees beauty then it is astonished. Such action is derived from the passions, which Rousseau claims in turn may be subordinated by the will. The will is grounded in the rational capacity of the self. Every self is rational, and it is the commonality of reason that Rousseau relies upon in his formulation of the ‘general will’ in the body politic. Rousseau holds in On The Social Contract that every individual would recognise the benefit, namely the maintenance of civil liberty, of submitting themselves to the social compact.
“What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he can get; what he gains is civil freedom and the proprietorship of everything he possesses.”
For Rousseau everyone would recognise the benefit of the social compact because it maximises their benefit over time. Thus they submit themselves to the social compact because of their ability to over-ride their individual passions to natural freedom, personal independence, afforded to them by reason.
So I have shown that both Kant and Rousseau present a self that uses reason, and has a will that is located only in the rational capacity of the self. According to Kant reason is accompanied by an autonomy to the use of that reason and also to the actions that have their origins in reason. Kant builds upon his notion of rational self the autonomous use of reason in regards to the formulation of rules that structure action, in which the individual treats themselves as an ends in itself to be legislated for. Kant expresses the dynamic of treating individuals as ends in themselves at a political level in Perpetual Peace.
“It is forbidden to every state to let troops to another state, against an enemy not common to both; for this is making use of the subjects as things to be disposed of at pleasure.”
In the above quote Kant expresses the view that each self is an ends in themselves and are not to be used as means. This notion is paralleled in Rousseau’s idea that the will is inalienable to the self. For Rousseau the will is the self’s own and no one else’s, it cannot be represented nor transferred. Rousseau goes so far as to argue that even in slavery the will is not alienated from the self, only the body and the practical uses of the body is used as a means, but the will cannot be so alienated. Kant, on the other hand, progresses from the inalienability of the will into the right the self has over their own person;
“That to be paid for killing, or to be killed, is to serve as an instrument or machine in the hands of another (the state) which is incompatible with the right which nature has given to everyone over his own person.”
Thus Kant claims that everyone has an inalienable right to be treated as ends in themselves, which is essential to the self as it can’t be over ridden even by powerful external bodies such as the State. If every self recognises itself as an ends, then it stands to reason – Kant postulates – that every rational being ought to be treated as ends in themselves and not only as means.
“Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will.”
Clearly Kant is resting on the condition of a rational being, which is arrived at from a self that has a will, in order to posit that the self can reason a structure that aligns all action to treat itself as an ends. I have shown that both Rousseau and Kant ground the will in the rational capacity of the self, and uses reason as a tool to justify action. The will is linked to action because it uses reason to autonomously construct a structure to align all action into general rules that treat itself as an ends. The construction of general rules for ends driven action is for Kant a moral structure. Thus recognising this connection – which Rousseau illustrated – between the will and reason one can better understand how reason is linked to morality. The Kantian imperatives are firmly grounded in reason by their connection to the will because they are constructions of ends based general rules applying to action. For Kant the will is found only in all rational beings, and so every rational being is an ends in itself. This allows Kant to arrive at the practical imperative, to wit;
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”
Having shown how the Kantian imperatives are founded in reason, by tracking the use of reason in the similarities between the Rousseauian and Kantian selves, I will now show how Kant develops Rousseau’s binding force between the self and the ‘general will’ – as law – into a force that binds the self to the imperatives as moral law. And a discussion of Rousseau’s and Kant’s approach to law; explaining Kant’s ‘reverence for the law’ as a binding force on the self as compared to Rousseau’s ‘respect for the law’. In particular close attention will be paid to the reliance on an internal compulsion to submit oneself to the law that is present in both Rousseau’s ‘respect’ and Kant’s ‘reverence’.
Rousseau’s association of ‘respect’ is best illustrated by the relationship between the self, as subject of the State, and the ‘general will’ when it is documented as law. When a subject submits itself to the law that subject recognises their own will encapsulated in the expression of the ‘general will’, that has become the law. The law, as an expression of the ‘general will’, is that which the self would submit to so long as every other self would likewise submit to it;
“The first to propose them [laws] merely states what everyone has already felt, and there is no question…to pass into law what each has already resolved to do as soon as he is sure others will do likewise.”
The ‘general will’ is not that of any particular self in isolation from others’; nor is it the expression of any particular interest or group interest. Rather the ‘general will’ is that of all the subjects of a given State, because they can each individually recognise their own will and the interests of ‘general good’ in the ‘general will’. So long as the self recognises the ‘general good’ in the ‘general will’, the self can subscribe to their own sense of what they ought to do as prescribed by the law. In this way the self recognises their own will encapsulated by the ‘general will’, while the pressures to do otherwise are lifted from each subject because the ‘general will’ applies to all its subjects equally. This recognition manifests within every subject as ‘respect for the law’; for inherent in ‘respect for the law’ is a respect in the authority of the law, derived from individuals themselves as authors of the law. Under the one ‘general will’ every self is placed in a greater state of liberty, civil liberty, to choose to act in conformity with the ‘general will’ which is their own.
It is the internal aspect of Rousseau’s ‘respect for the law’ that is of particular interest to us in regards to Kant’s notion of ‘reverence of the law’, and it is this aspect of Rousseau’s thought that is interesting in helping to show how ‘reverence’ binds the moral law to the self. Rousseau conceives of the self as self-legislating and as such the self becomes the author of the law. Thus the authority of the law is the authority of the self – the authority of the law comes from within the subject who submits themselves to the law. Kant’s idea of ‘reverence’ sits in a very similar relation to the imperatives.
“What I recognise immediately as law for me, I recognise with reverence, which means merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of external influences on my senses. Immediate determination of the will by the law and consciousness of this determination is called ‘reverence’, so that reverence is regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not the cause of the law.”
Kant clearly states that the self’s awareness of submission to the law comes only from oneself and nothing else. Yet the sentiment that follows is that ‘reverence’ is an effect of the law, such that it emanates from the law. For Kant to hold both of these statements the law must in some way come from within the self – or else ‘reverence’ is a cause of the law, which Kant strongly denies. Even though the source of the ‘reverence’ is internal it is not generated from ownership of the law but from the law itself;
“Yet although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but one self-produced by a rational concept.”
Rational concepts can only be generated by rational beings, who have a will. Thus Kant’s moral analysis constructs a similar self to the one presupposed by Rousseau’s political theory – self that has a will must be rational, and a rational self is one that has an autonomous use of reason and therefore is able to be the author of law. These are also Rousseauian concepts, which indicates that Kant and Rousseau are using the same philosophical toolbox. In Kant’s case the self is the author of moral law.
“The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that is must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as author).”
Kant is expressing how the will is bound to the law via authorship, which is not unlike the ownership of the law that Rousseau claims the self has expressed in the ‘general will’ – however the effects are different. For Kant the authorship is such because the will is an ends in itself and is therefore autonomous, i.e. law making. So Kant’s self is self-legislating like Rousseau’s. However for Rousseau ownership of the law is applied more generally in the encompassing of the private will by the ‘general will’, so that the self recognises its own will in the ‘general will’. It is important to note that Kant does not link his term ‘reverence for the law’ to ownership of the law in the same way that Rousseau links ‘respect for the law’ to ownership of the law in the ‘general will’. However, Rousseau’s internal mechanism, if traced accurately, is of great assistance in supplementing one’s understanding of the mechanism at work in Kant’s ‘reverence’, because the relationship between reason in the self and law is the same in both Kant and Rousseau.
Having discussed the internal place of the law in Groundwork, it is pertinent then to trace this back to the intellectuale internum discussed in Lectures on Ethics. It will become clear that both Kant’s and Rousseau’s notion of self has a will, is a rational being that autonomously self-legislates and bears an internal relationship to the general rule of law, which is expressed as ‘respect for the law’. It is in Lectures on Ethics that the Kantian imperatives have their pre-cursor in the general rule, and it is the intellectuale internum that universalises the relationship between the self and morality.
“Now the principle of morality is intellectuale internum, and must, therefore, be sought in action itself. Wherein then does it consist? Morality is the harmony of actions with the universally valid law of the free will: it is always the relation in which actions stand to the general rule.”
Kant states here the internal justification that is the basis of morality, that the self rationally develops a system of moral rules to govern action, i.e. self-legislates; succinctly expressed in the quote as a relationship between rules and actions. Kant develops the intellectuale internum, which is a rational internal justification particular to the self, as a means for the self to understand its relationship to the general rule. With the imperatives in The Groundwork, and Kant’s later work in the Critique of Pure Reason, he develops the idea of universality of reason well beyond what is present in Rousseau’s political philosophy – but it is in Lectures on Ethics, that Rousseau’s mechanism of submission to the ‘general will’ helps us to understand how Kant universalises morality through the general rule.
Kant provides a test of universalising the general rule by offering two examples; the maxim of telling lies, and the maxim of making a false promise. The test involves whether it is reasonable to the will that such maxims can be universally applied, that is to say that if one could will the maxim to apply regardless of circumstance and regardless of who is applying the maxim. The result, in both examples, Kant concludes, is a complete undermining of the maxim itself. For without the certainty of truth the maxim of telling lies is fruitless because the benefit to which the ends are directed by telling lies is not gained. There does not exist any general reason to uphold the maxim. Likewise, without the certainty of any promise being upheld the act of a promise, even a false one, becomes meaningless to the recipient of the promise; it would be as if the promise never existed. Kant’s universibility test reveals the idea of right that is held by the will.
“For everyone imagines that he could well respect the sacred idea of right, if he were sure that others would not violate it with regard to him.”
Kant makes the claim that the will holds a priori knowledge of the right action. Furthermore Kant states that such knowledge is inherent in all wills and thus all people. The similarity to Rousseau’s claims of the ‘general will’ suggest an analogous form of reasoning at work, especially to the universality of reason as a tool to generate ideal relations between people.
“The first to propose them [laws] merely states what everyone has already felt, and there is no question…to pass into law what each has already resolved to do as soon as he is sure others will do likewise.”
Rousseau here is drawing out an understanding of the self that would rationally submit to a principle that would protect the civil liberty of the self by ensuring that all others would likewise submit themselves to the same principle. Rousseau insists that everyone would reason the greater benefit to be had by each in such a social compact where everyone gains “civil freedom and the proprietorship of everything one possesses” . Everyone would recognise the greater benefit to themselves.
“Why is the ‘general will’ always right and why do all constantly want the happiness of each, if not because there is no one who does not apply this word each to himself, and does not think of himself as he votes?”
However from Kant’s analysis of reason he draws the categorical imperative, regardless of influence from Rousseau’s ‘general will’, which is by no means an appropriation nor re-iteration of the ‘general will’. Recognising the influence of Rousseau is useful, as it gives a reference point from which we can follow Kant’s direction in his formulations and reformulations of the principle of morality and the development of the attachment the self has with it in his pre-critical works to his critical works.
Both Rousseau and Kant detail a self that can build internal justifications for their own relationship to the general rule/will and so recognise the inherent authority of the general rule/will. What more, for both, the self has a will that can reason, or holds as reasonable, a distinct idea of right, of what is good. Kant already has the good bound up with the self as shown here;
“Therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which admittedly is present only in a rational being can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral, a good which is already present in the person acting on this idea and has not to be awaited merely from the result.”
Thus the imperatives are universal in their application because they are the laws generated by reason, which captures the pre-eminent good. The self can legislate laws that spring from the good of acting on the law. The Kantian imperatives form the basis of legislation that the rational self formulates for one self as an end, and to treat other rational beings like one treats oneself. The autonomy of reason allows for this self-legislation. However to self-legislate one must be able to transform the will in order that one may be able to conform to one’s own laws. The rational self therefore must be able to transform their self, which is a notion that is examined by Rousseau in The 2nd Discourse.
I now turn to Rousseau’s notion of a transforming will and its relationship to the self-legislating rational self. Rousseau uses the term perfectibilé to capture the self-transforming properties of the will. In The 2nd Discourse Rousseau identifies the ability of the self to compare oneself to the future as a pivotal moment in the transformation of the will. Until that point Rousseau maintains that the ‘naturale homine’ has an ideal will. For the ‘naturale homine’ has no concept of the good or just and so the will that the ‘naturale homine’ possesses can be neither good nor bad, just nor unjust, the will merely is, and realised ideally. The ideal will is not compared to anything, and lacks the ability to be transformed beyond being instantly recognised because the ‘naturale homine’ has no view to the future and cannot project oneself different to the present.
“If I strip this being, thus constituted, of all the supernatural gifts which he may have received, and of all the artificial faculties, which he could not have acquired but by slow degrees; if I consider him, in a word, such as he must have issued from the hands of nature; I see an animal less strong than some, and less active than others, but, upon the whole, the most advantageously organised of any: I see him satisfying the calls of hunger under the first oak, and those of thirst at the first rivulet; I see him laying himself down to sleep at the foot of the same tree, that afforded him his meal; and behold, this done, all his wants are completely supplied.”
In this paragraph Rousseau defines ‘naturale homine’ as a solitary wanderer who satisfies their wants in their immediacy. This wanderer, according to Rousseau, has a total lack of reflection in the enactment of the will and the passions. There is a lack of forethought in the context that surrounds ‘naturale homine’ – everything is put to use as much as it serves a purpose to satiate wants.
The ideal will, in the ‘naturale homine’, can be nothing but the unreflected action of reason. There exists no maliciousness or cunning, nor can there be selflessness or humility. Without an understanding of justice there is no framework for the will to ascribe to. The ideal will immediately expresses itself and only itself. On the other hand the ideal will cannot exist in the civilised self because of the knowledge the civilised self possesses on the good and the just.
“Man is weak when dependant and his own master before he grows robust. Hobbes did not consider that the same course, which hinders savages from making use of their reason, as our jurisconsults pretend, hinders them at the same time from making an ill use of their faculties, as he himself pretends; so that we may say that savages are not bad, precisely because they don’t know what it is to be good”
Here Rousseau makes the point that the limitations on the natural homine’s reason are the very thing that ensures the ideal will. The limitation to reason is its lack of reflexivity and an awareness of its universality, which allow for self improvement. Unfortunately, Rousseau argues, such limits are lifted only within a society of persons, where exists amour propre in the conventions, prejudices and structures that bind all members of a society. It is the wandering and solitary life of the ‘naturale homine’ in complete natural freedom that inhibits the conditions of acquiring perfectibilé. So it is with a slice of irony that Rousseau uses the term perfectibilé, for it is not to perfection, in which the ‘naturale homine’ is already situated, but a movement or striving toward the good. However the civilised self has a will that is susceptible to perfectibilé. As such the will is not an ideal will, rather it is a will that is manipulated by an understanding of what is good and just. The civilised self knows what is just and can act justly, likewise the civilised self knows what is unjust and can act unjustly. According to Rousseau not only can the framework of justice manipulate the will, but also society with its conventions and structure places manipulative weight and expectations upon the will of the civilised self. In the context of others the self has a rational choice to make regarding action, and it is this choice Rousseau claims that indefinitely corrupts the ideal will. However Rousseau admits that the will still has the ability to be good, because it is essentially the same will that is present in the ‘naturale homine’. All things ascribed as good can only be determined from a good will. And Kant agrees;
“It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.”
Kant uses Rousseau’s arrival at the good will in the civilised self as a starting point for his project of morality. The moral project for Kant that is presented by Rousseau is to find a system that strives to achieve the continual emergence of the good will. It is not a project of return to the ‘naturale homine’, despite the arguments of Seidler , Kant argues that there is no possible return. Kant intends to begin his account analytically rather than hypothetically as Rousseau did in his account of ‘naturale homine’.
“Rousseau proceeds synthetically starting with the natural man, while I propose to proceed analytically beginning with the moral man.”
What Kant finds in moral man is the good will, the starting point of the good, and so it is where Kant starts an account of morality. In order that the action of the civilised self be in conformity with the good will, the good will must first of all be recognised. As aforementioned in the section regarding the ‘general will’, Rousseau argues that it is only the rational self-legislative self who may act in conformity with the good will – for it is ‘respect for the law’, derived from authorship, that aligns the civilised self to the good will and without the recognition of authority in the good will the submission to it is not with respect but with ungrateful servitude.
My final task will be to examine Rousseau’s notion of self, as thus far constructed, with others, and thus according to Rousseau with amour propre, so that it may be compared to Kant’s analytical starting point of moral man. From this comparison one can see what sort of role Rousseau played as an initiator of Kant’s moral project. Firstly an account of amour propre will provide us with Rousseau’s understanding of the self with others; we’ll then move on to a brief overview of how Rousseau’s own political project counters the negative effects of amour propre with the use of amour de soi. This in turn will provide a context in which to understand Kantian moral philosophy – hopefully lines of similarity can be seen between the thought of the two; lines of similarity which could be read as possible influence.
According to Rousseau the ‘naturale homine’ enters a life with others by slow degrees until amour propre occurs. Amour propre is the type of love that Rousseau associates frequently with virtue and pride. Rousseau develops the notion of amour propre in The 2nd Discourse as the point in which ‘naturale homine’ develops by slow degrees the ability to make judgements of comparison on the basis of relative merit. The ability of comparison, according to Rousseau, is first built around identifying prey and objects of utility, but from the judgement of utility develops a comparison between the self and others.
“Man begins to consider different objects, and to make comparisons; they insensibly acquire ideas of merit and beauty and therefore soon produce sentiments of preference.”
Preference, Rousseau claims, is extended to others and back to the self, thus creating a social web that bears no semblance of what is good, but only what is relative. The development of the amour propre is important for Kant as it is Rousseau’s explication of amour propre that directs Kant toward his critical examination of society. This critical examination ultimately leads Kant to the conclusion that a moral structure is not to be found in the conventions and structure of society, in which fashion and frivolity rule, but is to be pursued in the rational essence of the self. To these ends Kant goes so far as to citing Rousseau as to leading him out of the woods in this regard;
“There was a time when…I despised the masses, which know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This blind prejudice disappears; I learn to honour men, and would find myself much more useless than common labourers if I did not believe that this view is able to give worth to all others, to establish the rights of humanity.”
Rousseau’s critical examination of the nature of the self locates the good will in the self, and it is this good will that sets Kant toward his project. For it is not society itself that Kant learns to honour, rather it is the nature of the self, the rational being that has the good will, that Kant honours. The conventions formed from life with others only serve to move the self away from the good will in the concern of what action one’s neighbours takes. The ‘naturale homine’ never had neighbours to ignite such comparisons. With the advent of the family, a condition in which people live in proximity to their benefit over time, opinion and preference develops.
“In fact, the real source of all those differences, is that the savage lives within himself, whereas the citizen, constantly beside himself, knows only how to live in the opinion of others.”
Rousseau states that amour propre excels itself to such a state that it becomes a means for the civilised self to justify action. Yet Rousseau reveals that amour propre has no foundation whatsoever, and is whimsical and in continual change in the true spirit of pride in an attempt to outdo whatever went before.
“Society no longer offers to our inspection but an assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions, which are the work of all these new relations, and have no foundation in nature.”
These new relations are those wrought by continual comparison between the self and others which Rousseau claims lack foundation for a moral framework. Rousseau shows the unnatural foundation of life with others caused by amour propre, which he counters with a politic that is founded on the natural good will of the rational being. Rousseau’s argument set the necessity for a rigorous and systematic account of moral action, which Rousseau would argue could only be founded in nature via the good will as an essence of the self.
Taken what has been shown in this paper, we can see the context in which Kant’s work can be seen to exhibit similarities to Rousseau’s. Kant has especially taken up the notion of the good will in the rational being as a foundation for his moral system, and extended into something much more than its political beginnings. However, prior to being influenced by Rousseau is the notion of self worth, of self love, that was already present in Kant from his Pietis upbringing.
Amour de soi, or self love, is for Rousseau the basic self preservation of the self’s life and body. For amour de soi is the underlying highest position of value for the self, and that is namely for itself.
“Every man may dispose as he pleases of what he possesses: but the case is otherwise with regard to the essential gifts of nature, such as life and liberty.”
Rousseau expresses the sanctity of life as it is handed down by nature. Such sanctity, says Rousseau, is expressed by the amour de soi. Rousseau uses self love as the weighing device against amour propre, in the sense that the law can appeal to self love, to the sanctity of life, above the pride and virtue as amour propre. However Rousseau makes one positive exception for the amour propre in the case of national pride, but even in this case the amour propre is twice underlined by self love; the ultimate safety of the subjects is the first priority of the State, and that virtue only exists in the love of the nation so long as it is a nation belonging to the subjects. The notion of self love plays a vital role in the political philosophy of On The Social Contract, to which ends Rousseau relies on each subject of the state to vote only with their will.
“Why is the ‘general will’ always right and why do all constantly want the happiness of each, if not because there is no one who does not apply this word each to himself, and does not think of himself as he votes?”
Everyone thinks only how by increasing the benefit of the ‘general good’ how their own happiness would increase relatively. So the ‘naturale homine’ when transformed into the civilised self still maintains amour de soi that reasons over and above the frivolous comparisons to the neighbour of amour propre. From Kant’s position of self-worth he diverges into morality, and not to over-ride sensuous drives with self-gain, but ground the imperatives in reason, relying on his understanding of a self that is rational and self-legislating and thus would be susceptible to the powers of reason.
Such is the context in which Kant begins his moral project. It is difficult to measure the difference between the persuasive force of Rousseau on Kant and the sympathy in argument already present within Kant’s ideas. For no doubt Kant had both in relation to Rousseau. However this paper has shown that Rousseau’s notion of self can be used to understand the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy, because on such a fundamental level Kant and Rousseau share a similar understanding of the self and place the same relationship between the self and reason. It has been shown that Kant and Rousseau use the same philosophical tools and show a familial resemblance in the basis of their respective projects. To these ends an understanding of Rousseau’s notion of self in relation to Kant is a valuable entry into understanding the manner in which Kant constructs his moral philosophy.
Bibliography
Cassier, Ernst. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans Peter Gay, Columbia University Press NY. 1954
Cassier, Ernst. Rousseau – Kant – Goethe, trans James Gutmann, Paul Kristeller, John Randall Jr. Archon Books. 1961
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963
Kant, Immanuel. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans John Goldthwait. University of California Press Berkeley. 1960
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Rousseau Judge of Jean Jacques: Dialogues, ed. Masters, R.D. & Kelly, C. trans. Bush, J. & Kelly, C. & Masters, R.D. University Press of New England. 1990
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Geneva Manuscript, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Confessions, trans. J.M. Cohen. Penguin Books. 1953
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960
Seidler, Victor. Kant, Respect and Injustice; The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1986
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963
Footnotes
Cassier, Ernst. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans Peter Gay, Columbia University Press NY. 1954. Pg 19
Ibid. pg 27
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 56
Rousseau’s State is the association of people of a common land that forces each to give up their natural right to fulfil impulse and replaces it with a duty to act rationally. See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 55/6
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 61
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 156
Ibid. Pg 165
Rousseau splits the self into the passions and the will in the 2nd Discourse in order to examine the moment of change when the self began using reason as the primary mode in which to base decisions. Rousseau coincides this change with the advent of society. Rousseau also makes the split, only in passing, in On The Social Contract as to the capacity of reason to which he makes his appeal, and in greater detail when, in the same text, he constructs the general will from the good will of the rational being.
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963. Pg XIX. This quote is taken from the introduction written by J. Macmurray.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 154
Ibid. Pg 171
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Footnote pg 96.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 61
I am using the shortening Critiques to refer to Kant’s works; The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason, and The Critique of Judgement.
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 144.
Ibid. Pg 44.
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 76
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 130 – 131.
Ibid. Pg 130
Ibid. Pg 63
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 169
Ibid. Pg 165
Ibid. Pg 170
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 61
Ibid. Pg 56
Ibid. Pg 56
Ibid. Pg 56
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 101
Ibid. Pg 68
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939. Pg 4
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 59
Ibid. 1978. Pg 60
Ibid. 1978. Pg 60
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939. Pg 4
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 95
Ibid. Pg 95. Italics are Kant’s.
Ibid. Pg 96. Italics are Kant’s.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 62
Ibid. Pg 109
The ‘general good’ as Rousseau uses the term is in reference to the physical and abstract goods, and actions, that are associated and belong to all the members of a group and by advantaging the ‘general good’ thus advantage all the members.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 110
Ibid. Pg 111
Ibid. Pg 110
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Footnote at Pg 69. Italics are Kant’s.
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 70
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Footnote at pg 69. Italic’s are Kant’s.
Ibid. Pg 98-99. Italics are Kant’s.
Ibid. pg 98
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963. Pg 42.
Ibid. Pg 42.
Ibid. Pg 42-43
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 70-1
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963. Pg 43 & Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 71
Ibid.
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939. Pg 50 footnote.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978
Ibid. Pg 109. Italics are mine.
Ibid. Pg 56
Ibid. Pg 62
Ibid. Pg 62
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Footnote at pg 69. Italic’s are Kant’s.
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 155
Ibid. Pg 155
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 37
Ibid. Pg 67
Rousseau uses the term ‘naturale homine’ to refer to the hypothetical person that exists as a solitary wanderer in the state of nature. The term, translated as natural man, loses its irony in the juxtaposition of the terms naturale and homine which is an oxymoronic reference to what is considered natural and what is considered constructed by man.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 68
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 36
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 17
Ibid. Pg 75
At this point I feel as though a mention should be made as to familiarity of Rousseau’s account of the natural homine situated in nature as an independent roaming rational being without a framework of good or justice is to the account of original man, Adam, in Genesis. It is not the place of this essay to further investigate this familiarity, but it is worth noting the high level of literary devices such as irony that suggests that this familiarity is yet another subtle attack upon Hobbes and his account of the state nature. One must remember that Rousseau makes the point that such hypothesising on the original state of man is somewhat of a furphy, as it is both (at the time) unknowable and misleading to procure arguments as a basis. All of which, in spite of Rousseau’s own hypothetical, this familiarity to a “Traditional Text” in which the age of reason is attempting to separate itself from seems to be a disguised rebuke.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 70
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 40
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 59
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 70
Ibid. Pg 100
Ibid. Pg 70
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 60
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 84
Ibid. Pg 77
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 61
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 60
Seidler, Victor. Kant, Respect and Injustice; The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1986. Pg 20
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 63
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 47. Schlipp quotes Kant from; Hartenstein, Kants Sammtliche Werke, VIII, pg 612
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 61
Ibid. Pg 61
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971 pg 113
Ibid. 1971 pg 113
Ibid. 1971 pg 115
Ibid. 1971 pg 113
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 65
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 47
Ibid. Pg 104
Ibid. Pg 48. Quoting from Hartenstein, Kants Sammtliche Werke, VII, pg 630
Seidler, Victor. Kant, Respect and Injustice; The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1986. Pg 17
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 180
Ibid. Pg 181
Ibid. Pg 179
Ibid. Pg 178
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 47
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 91
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 49
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997. Pg 68
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 154
Ibid. Pg 156
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997. Pg 74
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 97.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 62
Ibid. Pg 62
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997. Pg 99 ¶ 4:51 pm
In On The Social Contract Rousseau sets out to answer the question ‘what is law’ and in doing so he constructs a political theory wherein democratic sovereignty formulates law that ensures the civil liberties of all via the ‘general will’. The ‘general will’ is that which the self would submit to so long as everyone else would also submit to the same. For Hobbes the law is the dictates of the sovereign composed of a small council of individuals to which all others submit; Rousseau is not satisfied that Hobbes’ account is either legitimate or practical. Rousseau argues that such a council cannot have legitimate authority over all its subjects. Rousseau proposes a democratic formulation of sovereignty, which he argues is the only means of legitimising the sovereign and practically associating all subjects to the sovereign. In order to associate all the subjects of a State , Rousseau develops a notion that he calls the ‘general will’, which is properly understood not as the will of all, but as the will of the body politic framed against every individual will and encapsulating every individual will – Rousseau elucidates what he sees as the relation between wills in On The Social Contract.
“There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will. The latter considers only the common interest; the former considers private interest, and is only a sum of private wills. But take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out, and the remaining sum of the differences is the general will.”
For Rousseau in the very generation of the ‘general will’ there is a presupposition that every self has a will of their own. By way of examining the will we will gain insight into Rousseau’s self.
For our purpose it is prudent then, to locate the place of the will and its function in the self, because the will is a defining characteristic for the Rousseauian self. Rousseau identifies the will as the rational drive of action, while bodily drives he calls passions. This is an important distinction of drives and figures prominently in his subsequent analysis in the 2nd Discourse in two regards. Firstly this distinction posits two separate origins for action, and thus moral behaviour, which has the effect of creating conflict within the self. Secondly Rousseau claims that the passions can be made to submit to the will, which creates a rational standard for the self to judge action. Rousseau makes plain the submission of the passions to the will in the 2nd Discourse.
“The law, in general less strong than the passions, restrain men without changing them.”
Thus, Rousseau’s position is that bodily needs and desires must be answered, but within society the will restrains the immediacy of the body. Reason delays the fulfilment of the passions in recognition of the law.
Before we take a look at the use of reason in the Rousseauian self, I will examine the manner in which Rousseau splits the self into the passions and the will. Rousseau’s distinction between the passions and the will is similar to the manner in which Kant separates the moral self into ‘thought’ and ‘experienced’ in the text Lectures On Ethics. Macmurray argues that Kant grounds the moral worth of action in the realm of the thought only.
“Kant thinks it important to distinguish the theoretical from the practical elements in moral action, to separate the intellectual activity of judgement through which we determine what action ought to be done from the practical activity of the will which determines the performance of the action.”
Macmurray points out Kant’s division of moral action, separating the thought from the experienced, which places the will as a link between thought and experience. Rousseau identifies two sources of action, furthermore he claims that moral action can only come from one source, the will. Kant, on the other hand, splits moral action into practical and theoretical; the will, which Rousseau identifies, Kant splits into two, the will of action and the judgement of action. The will, in both Rousseau and Kant, is situated as the basis for the moral ought of action and the enaction of the ought.
Rousseau’s separation of the self into two distinct origins of action – rational and bodily – is a pre-cursor for the radical Kantian separation of the phenomenal and the noumenal self. Rousseau’s rational/bodily separation is an example of how a self can have two independent sources of knowing the world that do not influence each other and can independently institute action. Rousseau does not investigate the consequences of his separation apart from the significance of the rise of reason in determining action in the 2nd Discourse. Neither does Rousseau deny that the two parts of the self can work co-operatively, in fact he states the opposite. However the separation is one that is radically developed by Kant in the Critiques , and is evident in the discussion on the good will in the Groundwork. Kant identifies the noumenal self as the realm in which reason operates and thus a moral code is constructed. The Kantian phenomenal/noumenal distinction and Rousseau’s will/passions are not the same separation; but Kant’s thinking can be seen as a development upon Rousseau’s separation through to the formulation of a moral structure from the noumenal self, which I will show in the manner in which both Kant and Rousseau define the use of reason. In the Groundwork Kant sets out to clear the foundation on which morality is structured by discounting the sources of morality that are essentially ‘red herrings’. To this end Kant discredits the sensible world and the world of the intelligible, leaving an outline of the noumenal that he will not construct until the Critiques.
“Reason may be kept, on the one hand, from searching around in the sensible world – greatly to the detriment of morality – for the supreme motive and for some interest, comprehensible indeed, but empirical; and it may be kept, on the other hand, from flapping its wings impotently, without leaving the spot, in a space that for it is empty – the space of transcendent concepts known as ‘the intelligible world’.”
What Kant has arrived at is a sphere of the self which is radically separated from the phenomenal world, a world in which reason alone is posited. Only because reason is universal, Kant argues, can a moral system derived from reason be of worth and applied universally.
By examining how Rousseau explains the functionality of the will I can draw out how the Rousseauian self uses reason and then compare it to how the Kantian self uses reason, which should give us an insight into the separation of the self. According to Rousseau the origin of the passions is the body; the involuntary reactions and feelings the body has to the world and to its own sustenance stimulate action. i.e. If the body is hungry then it seeks food; if the body sees beauty then it is astonished. Such action is derived from the passions, which Rousseau claims in turn may be subordinated by the will. The will is grounded in the rational capacity of the self. Every self is rational, and it is the commonality of reason that Rousseau relies upon in his formulation of the ‘general will’ in the body politic. Rousseau holds in On The Social Contract that every individual would recognise the benefit, namely the maintenance of civil liberty, of submitting themselves to the social compact.
“What man loses by the social contract is his natural freedom and an unlimited right to everything that tempts him and that he can get; what he gains is civil freedom and the proprietorship of everything he possesses.”
For Rousseau everyone would recognise the benefit of the social compact because it maximises their benefit over time. Thus they submit themselves to the social compact because of their ability to over-ride their individual passions to natural freedom, personal independence, afforded to them by reason.
So I have shown that both Kant and Rousseau present a self that uses reason, and has a will that is located only in the rational capacity of the self. According to Kant reason is accompanied by an autonomy to the use of that reason and also to the actions that have their origins in reason. Kant builds upon his notion of rational self the autonomous use of reason in regards to the formulation of rules that structure action, in which the individual treats themselves as an ends in itself to be legislated for. Kant expresses the dynamic of treating individuals as ends in themselves at a political level in Perpetual Peace.
“It is forbidden to every state to let troops to another state, against an enemy not common to both; for this is making use of the subjects as things to be disposed of at pleasure.”
In the above quote Kant expresses the view that each self is an ends in themselves and are not to be used as means. This notion is paralleled in Rousseau’s idea that the will is inalienable to the self. For Rousseau the will is the self’s own and no one else’s, it cannot be represented nor transferred. Rousseau goes so far as to argue that even in slavery the will is not alienated from the self, only the body and the practical uses of the body is used as a means, but the will cannot be so alienated. Kant, on the other hand, progresses from the inalienability of the will into the right the self has over their own person;
“That to be paid for killing, or to be killed, is to serve as an instrument or machine in the hands of another (the state) which is incompatible with the right which nature has given to everyone over his own person.”
Thus Kant claims that everyone has an inalienable right to be treated as ends in themselves, which is essential to the self as it can’t be over ridden even by powerful external bodies such as the State. If every self recognises itself as an ends, then it stands to reason – Kant postulates – that every rational being ought to be treated as ends in themselves and not only as means.
“Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will.”
Clearly Kant is resting on the condition of a rational being, which is arrived at from a self that has a will, in order to posit that the self can reason a structure that aligns all action to treat itself as an ends. I have shown that both Rousseau and Kant ground the will in the rational capacity of the self, and uses reason as a tool to justify action. The will is linked to action because it uses reason to autonomously construct a structure to align all action into general rules that treat itself as an ends. The construction of general rules for ends driven action is for Kant a moral structure. Thus recognising this connection – which Rousseau illustrated – between the will and reason one can better understand how reason is linked to morality. The Kantian imperatives are firmly grounded in reason by their connection to the will because they are constructions of ends based general rules applying to action. For Kant the will is found only in all rational beings, and so every rational being is an ends in itself. This allows Kant to arrive at the practical imperative, to wit;
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”
Having shown how the Kantian imperatives are founded in reason, by tracking the use of reason in the similarities between the Rousseauian and Kantian selves, I will now show how Kant develops Rousseau’s binding force between the self and the ‘general will’ – as law – into a force that binds the self to the imperatives as moral law. And a discussion of Rousseau’s and Kant’s approach to law; explaining Kant’s ‘reverence for the law’ as a binding force on the self as compared to Rousseau’s ‘respect for the law’. In particular close attention will be paid to the reliance on an internal compulsion to submit oneself to the law that is present in both Rousseau’s ‘respect’ and Kant’s ‘reverence’.
Rousseau’s association of ‘respect’ is best illustrated by the relationship between the self, as subject of the State, and the ‘general will’ when it is documented as law. When a subject submits itself to the law that subject recognises their own will encapsulated in the expression of the ‘general will’, that has become the law. The law, as an expression of the ‘general will’, is that which the self would submit to so long as every other self would likewise submit to it;
“The first to propose them [laws] merely states what everyone has already felt, and there is no question…to pass into law what each has already resolved to do as soon as he is sure others will do likewise.”
The ‘general will’ is not that of any particular self in isolation from others’; nor is it the expression of any particular interest or group interest. Rather the ‘general will’ is that of all the subjects of a given State, because they can each individually recognise their own will and the interests of ‘general good’ in the ‘general will’. So long as the self recognises the ‘general good’ in the ‘general will’, the self can subscribe to their own sense of what they ought to do as prescribed by the law. In this way the self recognises their own will encapsulated by the ‘general will’, while the pressures to do otherwise are lifted from each subject because the ‘general will’ applies to all its subjects equally. This recognition manifests within every subject as ‘respect for the law’; for inherent in ‘respect for the law’ is a respect in the authority of the law, derived from individuals themselves as authors of the law. Under the one ‘general will’ every self is placed in a greater state of liberty, civil liberty, to choose to act in conformity with the ‘general will’ which is their own.
It is the internal aspect of Rousseau’s ‘respect for the law’ that is of particular interest to us in regards to Kant’s notion of ‘reverence of the law’, and it is this aspect of Rousseau’s thought that is interesting in helping to show how ‘reverence’ binds the moral law to the self. Rousseau conceives of the self as self-legislating and as such the self becomes the author of the law. Thus the authority of the law is the authority of the self – the authority of the law comes from within the subject who submits themselves to the law. Kant’s idea of ‘reverence’ sits in a very similar relation to the imperatives.
“What I recognise immediately as law for me, I recognise with reverence, which means merely consciousness of the subordination of my will to a law without the mediation of external influences on my senses. Immediate determination of the will by the law and consciousness of this determination is called ‘reverence’, so that reverence is regarded as the effect of the law on the subject and not the cause of the law.”
Kant clearly states that the self’s awareness of submission to the law comes only from oneself and nothing else. Yet the sentiment that follows is that ‘reverence’ is an effect of the law, such that it emanates from the law. For Kant to hold both of these statements the law must in some way come from within the self – or else ‘reverence’ is a cause of the law, which Kant strongly denies. Even though the source of the ‘reverence’ is internal it is not generated from ownership of the law but from the law itself;
“Yet although reverence is a feeling, it is not a feeling received through outside influence, but one self-produced by a rational concept.”
Rational concepts can only be generated by rational beings, who have a will. Thus Kant’s moral analysis constructs a similar self to the one presupposed by Rousseau’s political theory – self that has a will must be rational, and a rational self is one that has an autonomous use of reason and therefore is able to be the author of law. These are also Rousseauian concepts, which indicates that Kant and Rousseau are using the same philosophical toolbox. In Kant’s case the self is the author of moral law.
“The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that is must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as author).”
Kant is expressing how the will is bound to the law via authorship, which is not unlike the ownership of the law that Rousseau claims the self has expressed in the ‘general will’ – however the effects are different. For Kant the authorship is such because the will is an ends in itself and is therefore autonomous, i.e. law making. So Kant’s self is self-legislating like Rousseau’s. However for Rousseau ownership of the law is applied more generally in the encompassing of the private will by the ‘general will’, so that the self recognises its own will in the ‘general will’. It is important to note that Kant does not link his term ‘reverence for the law’ to ownership of the law in the same way that Rousseau links ‘respect for the law’ to ownership of the law in the ‘general will’. However, Rousseau’s internal mechanism, if traced accurately, is of great assistance in supplementing one’s understanding of the mechanism at work in Kant’s ‘reverence’, because the relationship between reason in the self and law is the same in both Kant and Rousseau.
Having discussed the internal place of the law in Groundwork, it is pertinent then to trace this back to the intellectuale internum discussed in Lectures on Ethics. It will become clear that both Kant’s and Rousseau’s notion of self has a will, is a rational being that autonomously self-legislates and bears an internal relationship to the general rule of law, which is expressed as ‘respect for the law’. It is in Lectures on Ethics that the Kantian imperatives have their pre-cursor in the general rule, and it is the intellectuale internum that universalises the relationship between the self and morality.
“Now the principle of morality is intellectuale internum, and must, therefore, be sought in action itself. Wherein then does it consist? Morality is the harmony of actions with the universally valid law of the free will: it is always the relation in which actions stand to the general rule.”
Kant states here the internal justification that is the basis of morality, that the self rationally develops a system of moral rules to govern action, i.e. self-legislates; succinctly expressed in the quote as a relationship between rules and actions. Kant develops the intellectuale internum, which is a rational internal justification particular to the self, as a means for the self to understand its relationship to the general rule. With the imperatives in The Groundwork, and Kant’s later work in the Critique of Pure Reason, he develops the idea of universality of reason well beyond what is present in Rousseau’s political philosophy – but it is in Lectures on Ethics, that Rousseau’s mechanism of submission to the ‘general will’ helps us to understand how Kant universalises morality through the general rule.
Kant provides a test of universalising the general rule by offering two examples; the maxim of telling lies, and the maxim of making a false promise. The test involves whether it is reasonable to the will that such maxims can be universally applied, that is to say that if one could will the maxim to apply regardless of circumstance and regardless of who is applying the maxim. The result, in both examples, Kant concludes, is a complete undermining of the maxim itself. For without the certainty of truth the maxim of telling lies is fruitless because the benefit to which the ends are directed by telling lies is not gained. There does not exist any general reason to uphold the maxim. Likewise, without the certainty of any promise being upheld the act of a promise, even a false one, becomes meaningless to the recipient of the promise; it would be as if the promise never existed. Kant’s universibility test reveals the idea of right that is held by the will.
“For everyone imagines that he could well respect the sacred idea of right, if he were sure that others would not violate it with regard to him.”
Kant makes the claim that the will holds a priori knowledge of the right action. Furthermore Kant states that such knowledge is inherent in all wills and thus all people. The similarity to Rousseau’s claims of the ‘general will’ suggest an analogous form of reasoning at work, especially to the universality of reason as a tool to generate ideal relations between people.
“The first to propose them [laws] merely states what everyone has already felt, and there is no question…to pass into law what each has already resolved to do as soon as he is sure others will do likewise.”
Rousseau here is drawing out an understanding of the self that would rationally submit to a principle that would protect the civil liberty of the self by ensuring that all others would likewise submit themselves to the same principle. Rousseau insists that everyone would reason the greater benefit to be had by each in such a social compact where everyone gains “civil freedom and the proprietorship of everything one possesses” . Everyone would recognise the greater benefit to themselves.
“Why is the ‘general will’ always right and why do all constantly want the happiness of each, if not because there is no one who does not apply this word each to himself, and does not think of himself as he votes?”
However from Kant’s analysis of reason he draws the categorical imperative, regardless of influence from Rousseau’s ‘general will’, which is by no means an appropriation nor re-iteration of the ‘general will’. Recognising the influence of Rousseau is useful, as it gives a reference point from which we can follow Kant’s direction in his formulations and reformulations of the principle of morality and the development of the attachment the self has with it in his pre-critical works to his critical works.
Both Rousseau and Kant detail a self that can build internal justifications for their own relationship to the general rule/will and so recognise the inherent authority of the general rule/will. What more, for both, the self has a will that can reason, or holds as reasonable, a distinct idea of right, of what is good. Kant already has the good bound up with the self as shown here;
“Therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which admittedly is present only in a rational being can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral, a good which is already present in the person acting on this idea and has not to be awaited merely from the result.”
Thus the imperatives are universal in their application because they are the laws generated by reason, which captures the pre-eminent good. The self can legislate laws that spring from the good of acting on the law. The Kantian imperatives form the basis of legislation that the rational self formulates for one self as an end, and to treat other rational beings like one treats oneself. The autonomy of reason allows for this self-legislation. However to self-legislate one must be able to transform the will in order that one may be able to conform to one’s own laws. The rational self therefore must be able to transform their self, which is a notion that is examined by Rousseau in The 2nd Discourse.
I now turn to Rousseau’s notion of a transforming will and its relationship to the self-legislating rational self. Rousseau uses the term perfectibilé to capture the self-transforming properties of the will. In The 2nd Discourse Rousseau identifies the ability of the self to compare oneself to the future as a pivotal moment in the transformation of the will. Until that point Rousseau maintains that the ‘naturale homine’ has an ideal will. For the ‘naturale homine’ has no concept of the good or just and so the will that the ‘naturale homine’ possesses can be neither good nor bad, just nor unjust, the will merely is, and realised ideally. The ideal will is not compared to anything, and lacks the ability to be transformed beyond being instantly recognised because the ‘naturale homine’ has no view to the future and cannot project oneself different to the present.
“If I strip this being, thus constituted, of all the supernatural gifts which he may have received, and of all the artificial faculties, which he could not have acquired but by slow degrees; if I consider him, in a word, such as he must have issued from the hands of nature; I see an animal less strong than some, and less active than others, but, upon the whole, the most advantageously organised of any: I see him satisfying the calls of hunger under the first oak, and those of thirst at the first rivulet; I see him laying himself down to sleep at the foot of the same tree, that afforded him his meal; and behold, this done, all his wants are completely supplied.”
In this paragraph Rousseau defines ‘naturale homine’ as a solitary wanderer who satisfies their wants in their immediacy. This wanderer, according to Rousseau, has a total lack of reflection in the enactment of the will and the passions. There is a lack of forethought in the context that surrounds ‘naturale homine’ – everything is put to use as much as it serves a purpose to satiate wants.
The ideal will, in the ‘naturale homine’, can be nothing but the unreflected action of reason. There exists no maliciousness or cunning, nor can there be selflessness or humility. Without an understanding of justice there is no framework for the will to ascribe to. The ideal will immediately expresses itself and only itself. On the other hand the ideal will cannot exist in the civilised self because of the knowledge the civilised self possesses on the good and the just.
“Man is weak when dependant and his own master before he grows robust. Hobbes did not consider that the same course, which hinders savages from making use of their reason, as our jurisconsults pretend, hinders them at the same time from making an ill use of their faculties, as he himself pretends; so that we may say that savages are not bad, precisely because they don’t know what it is to be good”
Here Rousseau makes the point that the limitations on the natural homine’s reason are the very thing that ensures the ideal will. The limitation to reason is its lack of reflexivity and an awareness of its universality, which allow for self improvement. Unfortunately, Rousseau argues, such limits are lifted only within a society of persons, where exists amour propre in the conventions, prejudices and structures that bind all members of a society. It is the wandering and solitary life of the ‘naturale homine’ in complete natural freedom that inhibits the conditions of acquiring perfectibilé. So it is with a slice of irony that Rousseau uses the term perfectibilé, for it is not to perfection, in which the ‘naturale homine’ is already situated, but a movement or striving toward the good. However the civilised self has a will that is susceptible to perfectibilé. As such the will is not an ideal will, rather it is a will that is manipulated by an understanding of what is good and just. The civilised self knows what is just and can act justly, likewise the civilised self knows what is unjust and can act unjustly. According to Rousseau not only can the framework of justice manipulate the will, but also society with its conventions and structure places manipulative weight and expectations upon the will of the civilised self. In the context of others the self has a rational choice to make regarding action, and it is this choice Rousseau claims that indefinitely corrupts the ideal will. However Rousseau admits that the will still has the ability to be good, because it is essentially the same will that is present in the ‘naturale homine’. All things ascribed as good can only be determined from a good will. And Kant agrees;
“It is impossible to conceive of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.”
Kant uses Rousseau’s arrival at the good will in the civilised self as a starting point for his project of morality. The moral project for Kant that is presented by Rousseau is to find a system that strives to achieve the continual emergence of the good will. It is not a project of return to the ‘naturale homine’, despite the arguments of Seidler , Kant argues that there is no possible return. Kant intends to begin his account analytically rather than hypothetically as Rousseau did in his account of ‘naturale homine’.
“Rousseau proceeds synthetically starting with the natural man, while I propose to proceed analytically beginning with the moral man.”
What Kant finds in moral man is the good will, the starting point of the good, and so it is where Kant starts an account of morality. In order that the action of the civilised self be in conformity with the good will, the good will must first of all be recognised. As aforementioned in the section regarding the ‘general will’, Rousseau argues that it is only the rational self-legislative self who may act in conformity with the good will – for it is ‘respect for the law’, derived from authorship, that aligns the civilised self to the good will and without the recognition of authority in the good will the submission to it is not with respect but with ungrateful servitude.
My final task will be to examine Rousseau’s notion of self, as thus far constructed, with others, and thus according to Rousseau with amour propre, so that it may be compared to Kant’s analytical starting point of moral man. From this comparison one can see what sort of role Rousseau played as an initiator of Kant’s moral project. Firstly an account of amour propre will provide us with Rousseau’s understanding of the self with others; we’ll then move on to a brief overview of how Rousseau’s own political project counters the negative effects of amour propre with the use of amour de soi. This in turn will provide a context in which to understand Kantian moral philosophy – hopefully lines of similarity can be seen between the thought of the two; lines of similarity which could be read as possible influence.
According to Rousseau the ‘naturale homine’ enters a life with others by slow degrees until amour propre occurs. Amour propre is the type of love that Rousseau associates frequently with virtue and pride. Rousseau develops the notion of amour propre in The 2nd Discourse as the point in which ‘naturale homine’ develops by slow degrees the ability to make judgements of comparison on the basis of relative merit. The ability of comparison, according to Rousseau, is first built around identifying prey and objects of utility, but from the judgement of utility develops a comparison between the self and others.
“Man begins to consider different objects, and to make comparisons; they insensibly acquire ideas of merit and beauty and therefore soon produce sentiments of preference.”
Preference, Rousseau claims, is extended to others and back to the self, thus creating a social web that bears no semblance of what is good, but only what is relative. The development of the amour propre is important for Kant as it is Rousseau’s explication of amour propre that directs Kant toward his critical examination of society. This critical examination ultimately leads Kant to the conclusion that a moral structure is not to be found in the conventions and structure of society, in which fashion and frivolity rule, but is to be pursued in the rational essence of the self. To these ends Kant goes so far as to citing Rousseau as to leading him out of the woods in this regard;
“There was a time when…I despised the masses, which know nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This blind prejudice disappears; I learn to honour men, and would find myself much more useless than common labourers if I did not believe that this view is able to give worth to all others, to establish the rights of humanity.”
Rousseau’s critical examination of the nature of the self locates the good will in the self, and it is this good will that sets Kant toward his project. For it is not society itself that Kant learns to honour, rather it is the nature of the self, the rational being that has the good will, that Kant honours. The conventions formed from life with others only serve to move the self away from the good will in the concern of what action one’s neighbours takes. The ‘naturale homine’ never had neighbours to ignite such comparisons. With the advent of the family, a condition in which people live in proximity to their benefit over time, opinion and preference develops.
“In fact, the real source of all those differences, is that the savage lives within himself, whereas the citizen, constantly beside himself, knows only how to live in the opinion of others.”
Rousseau states that amour propre excels itself to such a state that it becomes a means for the civilised self to justify action. Yet Rousseau reveals that amour propre has no foundation whatsoever, and is whimsical and in continual change in the true spirit of pride in an attempt to outdo whatever went before.
“Society no longer offers to our inspection but an assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions, which are the work of all these new relations, and have no foundation in nature.”
These new relations are those wrought by continual comparison between the self and others which Rousseau claims lack foundation for a moral framework. Rousseau shows the unnatural foundation of life with others caused by amour propre, which he counters with a politic that is founded on the natural good will of the rational being. Rousseau’s argument set the necessity for a rigorous and systematic account of moral action, which Rousseau would argue could only be founded in nature via the good will as an essence of the self.
Taken what has been shown in this paper, we can see the context in which Kant’s work can be seen to exhibit similarities to Rousseau’s. Kant has especially taken up the notion of the good will in the rational being as a foundation for his moral system, and extended into something much more than its political beginnings. However, prior to being influenced by Rousseau is the notion of self worth, of self love, that was already present in Kant from his Pietis upbringing.
Amour de soi, or self love, is for Rousseau the basic self preservation of the self’s life and body. For amour de soi is the underlying highest position of value for the self, and that is namely for itself.
“Every man may dispose as he pleases of what he possesses: but the case is otherwise with regard to the essential gifts of nature, such as life and liberty.”
Rousseau expresses the sanctity of life as it is handed down by nature. Such sanctity, says Rousseau, is expressed by the amour de soi. Rousseau uses self love as the weighing device against amour propre, in the sense that the law can appeal to self love, to the sanctity of life, above the pride and virtue as amour propre. However Rousseau makes one positive exception for the amour propre in the case of national pride, but even in this case the amour propre is twice underlined by self love; the ultimate safety of the subjects is the first priority of the State, and that virtue only exists in the love of the nation so long as it is a nation belonging to the subjects. The notion of self love plays a vital role in the political philosophy of On The Social Contract, to which ends Rousseau relies on each subject of the state to vote only with their will.
“Why is the ‘general will’ always right and why do all constantly want the happiness of each, if not because there is no one who does not apply this word each to himself, and does not think of himself as he votes?”
Everyone thinks only how by increasing the benefit of the ‘general good’ how their own happiness would increase relatively. So the ‘naturale homine’ when transformed into the civilised self still maintains amour de soi that reasons over and above the frivolous comparisons to the neighbour of amour propre. From Kant’s position of self-worth he diverges into morality, and not to over-ride sensuous drives with self-gain, but ground the imperatives in reason, relying on his understanding of a self that is rational and self-legislating and thus would be susceptible to the powers of reason.
Such is the context in which Kant begins his moral project. It is difficult to measure the difference between the persuasive force of Rousseau on Kant and the sympathy in argument already present within Kant’s ideas. For no doubt Kant had both in relation to Rousseau. However this paper has shown that Rousseau’s notion of self can be used to understand the basis of Kant’s moral philosophy, because on such a fundamental level Kant and Rousseau share a similar understanding of the self and place the same relationship between the self and reason. It has been shown that Kant and Rousseau use the same philosophical tools and show a familial resemblance in the basis of their respective projects. To these ends an understanding of Rousseau’s notion of self in relation to Kant is a valuable entry into understanding the manner in which Kant constructs his moral philosophy.
Bibliography
Cassier, Ernst. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans Peter Gay, Columbia University Press NY. 1954
Cassier, Ernst. Rousseau – Kant – Goethe, trans James Gutmann, Paul Kristeller, John Randall Jr. Archon Books. 1961
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963
Kant, Immanuel. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans John Goldthwait. University of California Press Berkeley. 1960
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Rousseau Judge of Jean Jacques: Dialogues, ed. Masters, R.D. & Kelly, C. trans. Bush, J. & Kelly, C. & Masters, R.D. University Press of New England. 1990
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978
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Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Confessions, trans. J.M. Cohen. Penguin Books. 1953
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960
Seidler, Victor. Kant, Respect and Injustice; The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1986
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963
Footnotes
Cassier, Ernst. The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans Peter Gay, Columbia University Press NY. 1954. Pg 19
Ibid. pg 27
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 56
Rousseau’s State is the association of people of a common land that forces each to give up their natural right to fulfil impulse and replaces it with a duty to act rationally. See Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 55/6
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 61
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 156
Ibid. Pg 165
Rousseau splits the self into the passions and the will in the 2nd Discourse in order to examine the moment of change when the self began using reason as the primary mode in which to base decisions. Rousseau coincides this change with the advent of society. Rousseau also makes the split, only in passing, in On The Social Contract as to the capacity of reason to which he makes his appeal, and in greater detail when, in the same text, he constructs the general will from the good will of the rational being.
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963. Pg XIX. This quote is taken from the introduction written by J. Macmurray.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 154
Ibid. Pg 171
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Footnote pg 96.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 61
I am using the shortening Critiques to refer to Kant’s works; The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason, and The Critique of Judgement.
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 144.
Ibid. Pg 44.
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 76
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 130 – 131.
Ibid. Pg 130
Ibid. Pg 63
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 169
Ibid. Pg 165
Ibid. Pg 170
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 61
Ibid. Pg 56
Ibid. Pg 56
Ibid. Pg 56
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 101
Ibid. Pg 68
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939. Pg 4
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 59
Ibid. 1978. Pg 60
Ibid. 1978. Pg 60
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939. Pg 4
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 95
Ibid. Pg 95. Italics are Kant’s.
Ibid. Pg 96. Italics are Kant’s.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 62
Ibid. Pg 109
The ‘general good’ as Rousseau uses the term is in reference to the physical and abstract goods, and actions, that are associated and belong to all the members of a group and by advantaging the ‘general good’ thus advantage all the members.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 110
Ibid. Pg 111
Ibid. Pg 110
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Footnote at Pg 69. Italics are Kant’s.
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 70
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Footnote at pg 69. Italic’s are Kant’s.
Ibid. Pg 98-99. Italics are Kant’s.
Ibid. pg 98
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963. Pg 42.
Ibid. Pg 42.
Ibid. Pg 42-43
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 70-1
Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics, trans Louis Infield. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1963. Pg 43 & Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 71
Ibid.
Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual Peace, Columbia University Press NY. 1939. Pg 50 footnote.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978
Ibid. Pg 109. Italics are mine.
Ibid. Pg 56
Ibid. Pg 62
Ibid. Pg 62
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Footnote at pg 69. Italic’s are Kant’s.
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 155
Ibid. Pg 155
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 37
Ibid. Pg 67
Rousseau uses the term ‘naturale homine’ to refer to the hypothetical person that exists as a solitary wanderer in the state of nature. The term, translated as natural man, loses its irony in the juxtaposition of the terms naturale and homine which is an oxymoronic reference to what is considered natural and what is considered constructed by man.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 68
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 36
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 17
Ibid. Pg 75
At this point I feel as though a mention should be made as to familiarity of Rousseau’s account of the natural homine situated in nature as an independent roaming rational being without a framework of good or justice is to the account of original man, Adam, in Genesis. It is not the place of this essay to further investigate this familiarity, but it is worth noting the high level of literary devices such as irony that suggests that this familiarity is yet another subtle attack upon Hobbes and his account of the state nature. One must remember that Rousseau makes the point that such hypothesising on the original state of man is somewhat of a furphy, as it is both (at the time) unknowable and misleading to procure arguments as a basis. All of which, in spite of Rousseau’s own hypothetical, this familiarity to a “Traditional Text” in which the age of reason is attempting to separate itself from seems to be a disguised rebuke.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 70
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 40
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 59
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 70
Ibid. Pg 100
Ibid. Pg 70
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 60
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 84
Ibid. Pg 77
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 61
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 60
Seidler, Victor. Kant, Respect and Injustice; The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1986. Pg 20
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 63
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 47. Schlipp quotes Kant from; Hartenstein, Kants Sammtliche Werke, VIII, pg 612
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans H J Patton. Harper Torchbooks NY. 1964. Pg 61
Ibid. Pg 61
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971 pg 113
Ibid. 1971 pg 113
Ibid. 1971 pg 115
Ibid. 1971 pg 113
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 65
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 47
Ibid. Pg 104
Ibid. Pg 48. Quoting from Hartenstein, Kants Sammtliche Werke, VII, pg 630
Seidler, Victor. Kant, Respect and Injustice; The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London. 1986. Pg 17
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 180
Ibid. Pg 181
Ibid. Pg 179
Ibid. Pg 178
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 47
Velkley, Richard. On the Moral Foundations of Kant’s Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press Chicago. 1989. Pg 91
Schilpp, P. Kant’s Pre-Critical Ethics, Northwestern University Press. 1960. Pg 49
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997. Pg 68
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. A Discourse upon the Origin and Foundation of the Inequality among Man, Burt Franklin NY. 1971. Pg 154
Ibid. Pg 156
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997. Pg 74
Wright, E. The Meaning of Rousseau, Russel & Russel NY. 1963. Pg 97.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. On The Social Contract, St. Martin’s Press NY. 1978. Pg 62
Ibid. Pg 62
O’Hagan, T.(ed) Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Sources of the Self, Avebury, 1997. Pg 99 ¶ 4:51 pm
